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the purpose of avoiding escalation� But 
ultimately, no government intervenes 
for the sake of keeping a conflict limited; 
regardless of that goal, its actions will 
be determined most by the political 
objective it seeks to achieve� The author’s 
theory sheds light on one aspect of the 
actors’ motives in cases in which the 
desire to avoid escalation is relatively 
strong� But, as in the case of any such 
theory, understanding such situations 
requires a full assessment of the goals 
and circumstances of each of the actors�
ABRAM N� SHULSKY
China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations, ed� An-
drew S� Erickson and Ryan D� Martinson� An-
napolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2019� 352 
pages� $50�
In its long history, China has deployed 
substantial naval power, but only 
episodically� It never faced sustained 
naval threats, so the country’s maritime 
frontier was not a perennial strategic 
concern� But in more modern times, 
seaborne pressures from the Western 
powers and Japan became unremitting� 
Foreign navies even sailed deep into the 
country’s interior, establishing “treaty 
ports” hundreds of miles from the coast� 
This ended with the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China in 1949� Still, 
even though Western naval power was 
pushed offshore, seaborne forces nearby 
could attack China with impunity�
This rankled, but what to do? In 1965, 
Marshal Lin Biao (perhaps Chairman 
Mao’s closest comrade in arms) looked 
to the earlier defeat of Japan by the 
once-tiny People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) to ask, “How was it possible for a 
weak country finally to defeat a strong 
country?” His answer was found in 
Mao Zedong’s idea of “People’s War�” 
Although land based, the concept held 
promise for menacing forward naval 
positions of the United States, perceived 
as the foremost opponent� Having 
backed an insurgency in the Philippines, 
a coup attempt in Indonesia, and guerilla 
wars in Malaya and Vietnam, Beijing 
could imagine pushing the United 
States out of great anchorages such as 
Subic, Cam Rahn, and Singapore� As 
for Yokosuka, Japan—the U�S� Navy’s 
most important base in the western 
Pacific—a successful political campaign 
might chase the United States four 
thousand miles east, back to Honolulu�
This was naval warfare de facto, but 
it did not succeed� In the end, China 
learned that American sea power 
could not be neutralized on the cheap� 
However, China began to rise 
economically through its seaborne 
connections, and in the 1980s Admiral 
Liu Huaqing—sometimes called “China’s 
Mahan”—made a case for a strong navy� 
This vision was realized more fully in 
2012 when Communist Party leader Hu 
Jintao announced a new national goal: 
“to enhance our capacity for exploiting 
marine resources, develop the marine 
economy, protect the marine maritime 
rights and interests, and build China 
into a strong maritime power�”
During this same period of an economi-
cally rising China, the Naval War Col-
lege’s China Maritime Studies Institute 
became a leading center for analyzing 
China’s naval power� Two of the Insti-
tute’s mainstays, Andrew Erickson and 
Ryan Martinson, again have contributed 
to our understanding by assembling and 
editing twenty papers prepared for a 
2017 conference on what could turn out 
to be the most significant component 
of China’s modus operandi at sea: 
exploitation of the so-called gray zone�
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This anthology reminds us that the naval 
battle with China already is underway, 
and that it is about more than big ships, 
aircraft, and submarines� The PLA 
Navy, which certainly likes to show 
off its new fleet, also relies on a coast 
guard, fishing boats, and maritime 
militia, which are perfectly suited for 
a gray-zone space of neither war nor 
peace� As a result, China has succeeded 
in enclosing and then militarizing areas 
once thought of as high seas� China, 
in best Leninist fashion, continues to 
probe and push, encountering “mush” 
instead of the steel of real resistance�
This is certainly not “decisive naval 
battle–ism,” nor is it quite “people’s war 
at sea�” Still, Mao’s dicta echo: a struggle 
is 10 percent military / 90 percent 
political; avoid the decisive encounter 
until the very last moment; and, above 
all, protract, to enable one to build from 
weakness to strength� Soon after becom-
ing a Communist Party leader in 2013, 
Xi Jinping told his comrades in a private 
speech that China would remain weaker 
than the West for some time� China’s 
naval operations in the maritime gray 
zone—patient, purposeful, relentless— 
embody Maoist patience, buying 
time to maneuver from a position of 
relative weakness to one of strength�
The papers collected in this new work, 
China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations, 
can help us better understand this 
maneuvering and meet the challenges 
the West already faces—challenges 
that only will grow as China’s naval 
strength and presence grow�
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